Demetrius Mazacoufa, P.C.

GEORGIA SUPREME COURT RELIEVES HEALTH PR0FESSIONALS FROM DUTY TO DISCLOSE PERSONAL LIFE FACTORS

In a widely followed case, the Georgia Supreme Court held this week that medical doctors, (and by extension all licensed professionals including other health care personnel), have no duty to disclose personal problems which could affect their skills, including problems such as drug addiction. Justice Leah W. Sears, writing for the majority in Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, No. S99G0600 (Sup. Ct. Ga. March 6, 2000), stated that "absent inquiry by a patient or client, there is neither a common law nor statutory duty on the part of either physicians or other professionals to disclosse to their patients or clients unspecified life factors which might be sujectively considered to adversely affect the professional's performance."

This case came to the Supreme Court from an appeal of a ruling in the Georgia Court of Appeals. (See October 12, 1999 article in this Web page section.) In this case, Dr. Timothy Trulock, an Albany physician, was found to have violated a duty to disclose his drug use before performed surgery on his patient, William G. Cleveland. That court also had reversed the trial judge on fraud and battery claims.

The justices in the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision concluded that failure to disclose certain "life factors" could not be the basis for a fraud claim. They split 5-2 on the battery issue, with the majority holding that failure to disclose did not vitiate a patient's consent so as to authorize a battery claim.

Until 1989 with the passage of the Informed Consent Doctrine, Georgia's medical doctors did not have to disclose any risks in the course of treatment. With the enactment of O.C.G.A. Section 31-9-6.1, doctors had to disclose risks within six categories of treatment. However, no category required the disclosure of personal aspects of a physician's life which might affect their performance. Justice Sears wrote that this statute must be strictly construed and not expanded, something the Court of Appeals by "impermissably expand[ing] upon the statutory disclosure required of health care providers, and impos[ing] upon health care providers a new, judicially-created duty of disclosure."

The basis of the minority opinion in this case was expressed by Justice George H. Carley who wrote that the concept of valid consent rests on a professional's qualifications or lack thereof. "Regardless of where the line ultimately is drawn with regard to a doctor's duty to disclose in order to avoid civil litigation for an unauthorized touching, Dr. Trulock crossed taht line whenhe obtained Mr. Cleveland's consent without disclosing a factor whch could result in the doctor's criminal prosecution and puts his professional license in jeopardy.".

[back to top]



	GEORGIA SUPREME COURT RELIEVES HEALTH PR0FESSIONALS FROM DUTY TO DISCLOSE PERSONAL LIFE FACTORS In a widely followed case, the Georgia Supreme Court held this week that medical doctors, (and by extension all licensed professionals including other health care personnel), have no duty to disclose personal problems which could affect their skills, including problems such as drug addiction. Justice Leah W. Sears, writing for the majority in Albany Urology Clinic v. Cleveland, No. S99G0600 (Sup. Ct. Ga. March 6, 2000), stated that "absent inquiry by a patient or client, there is neither a common law nor statutory duty on the part of either physicians or other professionals to disclosse to their patients or clients unspecified life factors which might be sujectively considered to adversely affect the professional's performance." This case came to the Supreme Court from an appeal of a ruling in the Georgia Court of Appeals. (See October 12, 1999 article in this Web page section.) In this case, Dr. Timothy Trulock, an Albany physician, was found to have violated a duty to disclose his drug use before performed surgery on his patient, William G. Cleveland. That court also had reversed the trial judge on fraud and battery claims. The justices in the Supreme Court in a unanimous decision concluded that failure to disclose certain "life factors" could not be the basis for a fraud claim. They split 5-2 on the battery issue, with the majority holding that failure to disclose did not vitiate a patient's consent so as to authorize a battery claim. Until 1989 with the passage of the Informed Consent Doctrine, Georgia's medical doctors did not have to disclose any risks in the course of treatment. With the enactment of O.C.G.A. Section 31-9-6.1, doctors had to disclose risks within six categories of treatment. However, no category required the disclosure of personal aspects of a physician's life which might affect their performance. Justice Sears wrote that this statute must be strictly construed and not expanded, something the Court of Appeals by "impermissably expand[ing] upon the statutory disclosure required of health care providers, and impos[ing] upon health care providers a new, judicially-created duty of disclosure." The basis of the minority opinion in this case was expressed by Justice George H. Carley who wrote that the concept of valid consent rests on a professional's qualifications or lack thereof. "Regardless of where the line ultimately is drawn with regard to a doctor's duty to disclose in order to avoid civil litigation for an unauthorized touching, Dr. Trulock crossed taht line whenhe obtained Mr. Cleveland's consent without disclosing a factor whch could result in the doctor's criminal prosecution and puts his professional license in jeopardy.". [back to top]
Copyright © 1999, 2000, Demetrius Mazacoufa, P.C. All rights reserved.